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Abstract
We study the problem of sharing the revenues raised from the collective sale of broadcasting
rights for sports leagues. We characterize the sharing rules satisfying three basic and intuitive
axioms: symmetry, additivity and maximum aspirations. They convey a natural compromise
between two focal rules, arising from polar estimations of teams loyal viewers. We also show
that these compromise rules have further interesting properties, such as allowing for the exis-
tence of a majority voting equilibrium. We bring some of the testable implications from our
axiomatic analysis to the real case of European football leagues.
Keywords: resource allocation, broadcasting, sports leagues, compromise rules, testable impli-
cations.
JEL numbers: D63, D72, H80, Z20.
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1 Introduction
Sources report that half of the worlds population watched the nal game of the 2010 FIFA
World Cup (e.g., Palacios-Huerta, 2014). The increasing popularity during the last two decades
of televised sports events has had signicant e¤ects on the broadcasting sectors and sports
leagues in North America and Europe (e.g., Cave and Crandall, 2001). According to Kantar
Media estimates, sports programming in 2014-15 generated $8:47 billion in sales for ABC,
CBS, NBC and Fox, a 35% increase from ve years before, accounting for more than one-third
of the Big Fours overall ad revenue for the period.2 As for sports organizations, the sale
of broadcasting and media rights is currently their biggest source of revenue. According to
Statista, more than 50 percent of the revenue that the (US) National Football League as a
whole generated in 2015 is attributable to television rights deals.
The sale of broadcasting rights for sports leagues is often carried out through some sort of
collective bargaining involving all participating organizations (teams) in a given competition on
the one hand, and broadcasting companies on the other hand.3 Thus, an ensuing key problem
arises in which the revenues collected from the sale have to be shared among the teams. This
is, by no means, a straightforward problem, mostly because the individual contribution to the
revenues is not known. Furthermore, the revenue is sizable, which renders the solution of the
problem crucial for the management of most sports organizations.
The revenue sharing rules used by the leagues are actually strikingly di¤erent between North
America and Europe. In North America, contracts essentially involve equal sharing, whereas
in Europe, performance-based reward schemes are widespread. The latter is rationalized by
Palomino and Szakovics (2004) due to the competitive environment in which European leagues
operate.4 On the other hand, as explained by Fort and Quirk (1995), in a one-team-one-vote
environment, such as the one in North America, equal sharing is more or less guaranteed because
the national contract can be approved only if there is a virtual consensus among league teams.5
2In the era of streaming, sports has become the cornerstone to television programming, playing the role of
a defensive wall against online disruption (e.g., Lee, 2019).
3Falconieri et al., (2004) provide a welfare analysis of collective vs. individual sale of TV rights.
4In Europe, as opposed to North America, teams but also leagues have incentives to compete for talent.
5Weak-drawing teams can block unequal sharing by refusing to permit televising of games involving them
and strong-drawing teams. This happened to be a protable bargaining strategy for Betis in the pre-collective
sale era of TV rights for La Liga when they were paired with Real Madrid for the rst game of the 2003/2004
season, which was the highly anticipated debut of David Beckham in such a tournament.
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In this paper, we align with the European case, assuming that broadcast-revenue sharing
goes beyond equal sharing. More precisely, as in our recent papers (Bergantiños and Moreno-
Ternero, 2020a, 2020b), we consider a simple formal model in which the sharing process is based
on the (broadcasting) audiences that games throughout the season generate. We then take the
axiomatic approach for such a model to derive appropriate sharing rules.
To wit, we consider three basic and intuitive axioms for sharing rules: symmetry, additivity
and maximum aspirations. The rst one says that if two teams have the same overall audiences,
then they should receive equal amounts.6 The second one says that revenues should be additive
on audiences.7 The third axiom says that no team can receive more than its claim, i.e., the total
revenue obtained from all the games in which the team was involved. These three axioms, which
seem to be innocuous independently, have a strong bite when combined. We actually show (in
the main result of this paper) that they characterize a family of rules that o¤er a compromise
between two focal and somewhat polar rules (that is why we call them compromise rules).
On the one hand, the so-called equal-split rule which splits the audience of each game equally
among the two teams. On the other hand, the so-called concede-and-divide, which concedes
each team the audience coming from its fan base (the loyal viewers watching all games played
by that team) and divides equally the residual. The two rules have distinguishing merits, but
they treat fans in two opposite and somewhat extreme ways. The equal-split rule essentially
ignores the existence of fan bases as it considers, de facto, that both teams participating in a
game contributed equally to the revenues collected from broadcasting that game. On the other
hand, concede-and-divide essentially ignores the existence of casual viewers as it considers, de
facto, that viewers watching a game are either fans of one participating team, or compulsive
viewers, who watch all games in the season. The scenarios underlying the equal-split rule and
concede-and-divide can be thought of as meaningful lower and upper bounds, depending on
whether the team has a weak or strong fan base. Reality seems to be somewhat in between
those two scenarios. Thus, compromising between both rules seems to be a natural move. That
is precisely what we do in this paper.
6As we shall argue later, revenues can be reduced to audiences provided one assumes a constant pay-per-view
fee for each game.
7An interpretation is that the aggregation of the revenue sharing in two seasons (involving the same teams)
is equivalent to the revenue sharing in the hypothetical combined season aggregating the audiences of the
corresponding games in both seasons.
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Each rule in the family we characterize is simply dened by a certain convex combination
of the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide. More precisely, for a given parameter  2
[0; 1], the rule R selects, for each problem, the convex combination of the solutions suggested
by the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide for that problem, with weights  and 1   ,
respectively. Note that, when the set of options is equipped with a convex structure (as in
this case), averaging between di¤erent positions that people may take concerning the best way
of approaching problems is an appealing way of nding some common ground between them.8
What is remarkable in our setting is that this position is normatively supported by three simple
and intuitive principles, as our characterization shows.
We then explore the family so derived and discover further interesting features of it.
First, we show that, if we allow teams to vote for any rule within the family, then a majority
voting equilibrium exists, i.e., a rule that cannot be overturned by any other rule within the
family through majority rule. This feature avoids the existence of disturbing majority cycles
and it is a consequence of the fact that the rules within the family satisfy the so-called single-
crossing property, which allows one to separate those teams that benet from the application
of one rule or the other rule, depending on the rank of their claims.9
Second, we show that the rules within the family yield outcomes that are fully ranked
according to the Lorenz dominance criterion, the most fundamental principle for the evaluation
of inequality (e.g., Dasgupta et al., 1973; Atkinson and Bourguignon, 1987). More precisely,
for each problem, and each pair of rules within the family, the outcome suggested by the rule
associated with a higher parameter dominates (in the sense of Lorenz) the outcome suggested
by the other rule, which is equivalent to saying that the former will be more egalitarian than
the latter.
Due to the previous feature, the parameter describing the family can be considered as an
index of egalitarianism within the family. As a matter of fact, the parameter can also be
considered as an estimation of the percentage of viewers who watch a game without being a
fan of one of the teams playing the game.10 In other words, a low value of the parameter is
associated with a large fan base for participating teams, whereas a high value of the parameter
8Averaging to compromise is a recurrent theme in game theory and resource allocation (Thomson, 2019a).
9It is well known that a su¢cient condition for the existence of a majority voting equilibrium is that voters
exhibit intermediate preferences over the set of alternatives (e.g., Gans and Smart, 1996).
10This is reminiscent of the concept of neutral (as opposed to hard-core) fans introduced by Szymanski (2001).
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is associated with a small fan base for participating teams.
A third interesting feature of the family is that it can be applied to real-life situations. More
precisely, we consider the case of the Spanish Football League and apply the family to explore
several allocation schemes therein. An important aspect of the rules in our family is that they
have a minimal informational basis, which allows us to use them even when there is limited
available data (as, unfortunately, happens to be the case with European football leagues).
One-parameter families, such as the one we derive in this paper, have been frequently
highlighted in the literature. Atkinson (1970) famously introduced a family of inequality mea-
sures, characterized by a weighting parameter measuring aversion to inequality. Somewhat
related, Donaldson and Weymark (1980) generalized the social-evaluation function correspond-
ing to the focal Gini inequality index to derive the (one-parameter) family of generalized Gini
inequality indices.11 In a context more similar to ours, Moulin (1987) characterized a fam-
ily compromising between the equal and proportional surplus sharing methods. As a matter
of fact, his family is the convex combination of those two methods and one of the axioms
used for its characterization is precisely additivity. Thus, the parallelism with our result is
strong. Something similar happens in minimum cost spanning tree problems, where Trudeau
(2014) characterizes the convex combination of the folk rule (e.g., Bergantiños and Vidal-Puga,
2007) and the so-called cycle-complete rule (e.g., Trudeau, 2002), also making use of additivity.
Compromises between the proportional and constrained equal-award rules (thus, satisfying the
standard non-negativity condition for claims problems) have also been considered by Thomson
(2015a,b). Moreno-Ternero and Villar (2006) introduced a one-parameter family of rules for
claims problems generalizing the so-called Talmud rule (e.g., Aumann and Maschler, 1985) and
encompassing (as extreme cases) the polar constrained equal awards and losses rules. The rules
within such a family also happen to satisfy the single-crossing property and be fully ranked
according to the Lorenz dominance criterion (e.g., Moreno-Ternero, 2011).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Section 2. We
present the axiomatic characterization leading to the family in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted
to explore additional properties of the rules within the family. In Section 5, we bring testable
implications from our analysis to the case of the Spanish Football League. We conclude in
Section 6. Some technical aspects have been deferred to an Appendix.
11See also Weymark (1981) and Bossert (1990).
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2 The model
We consider the model introduced by Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2020a). Let N describe
a nite set of teams. Its cardinality is denoted by n. We assume n  3. For each pair of teams
i; j 2 N , we denote by aij the broadcasting audience (number of viewers) for the game played
by i and j at is stadium. We use the notational convention that aii = 0, for each i 2 N .
Let A 2 Ann denote the resulting matrix of broadcasting audiences generated in the whole
tournament involving the teams within N .12 Each matrix A 2 Ann with zero entries in the
diagonal will thus represent a problem and we shall refer to the set of problems as P.13
Let i (A) denote the total audience achieved by team i, i.e.,
i (A) =
X
j2N
(aij + aji):
Without loss of generality, we normalize the revenue generated from each viewer to 1 (to be
interpreted as the pay per view fee). Thus, we sometimes refer to i (A) by the claim of
team i. When no confusion arises, we write i instead of i (A). We dene  as the average
audience of all teams. Namely,
 =
P
i2N
i
n
:
For each A 2 Ann, let jjAjj denote the total audience of the tournament. Namely,
jjAjj =
X
i;j2N
aij =
1
2
X
i2N
i =
n
2
:
A (sharing) rule is a mapping that associates with each problem the list of the amounts the
teams get from the total revenue. Thus, formally, R : P ! Rn is such that, for each A 2 P,
X
i2N
Ri(A) = jjAjj:
Two rules stand out as focal for this problem (e.g., Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero, 2020a,
2020b). First, the so-called equal-split rule, which splits equally the audience of each game
12We are therefore assuming a round-robin tournament in which each team plays in turn against each other
team twice: once home, another away, which is the format of most of the national football leagues. Our model
could be extended though to account for tournaments in which some teams play other teams a di¤erent number
of times. In such a case, aij would denote the broadcasting audience in all games played by i and j at is
stadium.
13As the set N will be xed throughout our analysis, we shall not explicitly consider it in the description of
each problem.
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(among the two teams), thus ignoring the existence of fans for each team. Second, the so-called
concede-and-divide, which concedes each team its number of fans and divides equally the rest.
They are, nevertheless, dened in a similar way. First, each team i tentatively receives its claim
(i). Second, they each subtract from it an amount associated to the remaining n 1 teams. In
the case of the equal-split rule, an equal share of half of the teams total audience (i =
i=2
n 1
); in
the case of concede-and-divide, the average audience per game that the remaining teams played
(i =
P
j;k2Nnfig
(ajk+akj)
(n 2)(n 1)
).14 Formally,
Equal-split rule, ES: for each A 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
ESi(A) = i   (n  1)i =
i
2
:
Concede-and-divide, CD: for each A 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
CDi(A) = i   (n  1)i =
(n  1)i   jjAjj
n  2
:
We now consider a family of rules that o¤er a compromise between the equal-split rule and
concede-and-divide. They are dened as convex combinations of the two rules. Formally,
Compromise rules,

C
	
2[0;1]
: for each  2 [0; 1] ; each A 2 P, and each i 2 N ,
Ci (A) = ESi(A) + (1  )CDi(A):
At the risk of stressing the obvious, note that when  = 0 then C coincides with concede-
and-divide, whereas when  = 1 then C coincides with the equal-split rule. That is, C0  CD
and C1  ES.
Note also that, with straightforward algebraic computations, we can obtain that, for each
A 2 P, each i 2 N , and each  2 [0; 1] ;
Ci (A) =
i
2
+
n(1  )
2 (n  2)
(i   ) : (1)
One can easily infer from the previous expression that, if i < , then C

i (A) is an increasing
function of , thus maximized at  = 1. If, instead, i > , then C

i (A) is a decreasing function
of , thus maximized at  = 0. Finally, if i = ; then C

i (A) =
i
2
for each  2 [0; 1].
14The term concede-and-divide, which was coined by Thomson (2003) in a di¤erent setting, is justied here
by an intuitive procedure, based on a form of statistical estimation aiming to capture the loyal viewers of each
team, which leads to this rule (see Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2020a) for further details).
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Generalizing what we said above for its two extreme rules, each rule within the family can
be obtained with a two-step process: rst, each team i tentatively receives its claim (i), and
then we subtract from it an amount associated to the remaining n   1 teams (in this case,
i = i + (1  )i). Formally,
Ci (A) = i   (n  1)i = i   (n  1)(i + (1  )i):
3 The characterization
We now introduce three natural axioms for rules.
The rst axiom is a minimal requirement of impartiality, a basic requirement of justice (e.g.,
Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, 2006). It says that if two teams have equal total audience, then
they should receive equal amounts.
Symmetry: For each A 2 P, and each pair i; j 2 N , such that i = j,
Ri(A) = Rj(A):
The second axiom is a robustness axiom indicating that when two equally valid perspectives
can be taken in evaluating a situation, it seems natural to require that these two perspectives
result in the same outcome (e.g., Thomson, 2019b). More precisely, the axiom states that
revenues should be additive on A.15 Formally,
Additivity: For each pair A and A0 2 P,
R (A+ A0) = R(A) +R (A0) :
The third axiom says that each team should receive, at most, the total audience of the
games played by the team. It therefore formalizes a natural upper bound, akin to the standard
requirement of claims boundedness for the problem of adjudicating conicting claims (e.g.,
ONeill, 1982; Thomson, 2019a).
Maximum aspirations: For each A 2 P and each i 2 N ,
Ri(A)  i:
15One might argue that subadditivity, i.e., for each pair A and A0 2 P, R (A+A0)  R(A)+R (A0) ; is a more
reasonable axiom. It turns out that both axioms are equivalent in our setting due to the denition of rules.
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The next result states that just the combination of the three previous axioms characterizes
the family of compromise rules. This is remarkable as the three axioms are intuitive and basic
and none of them seem to convey strong implications individually.
Theorem 1 A rule satises symmetry, additivity, and maximum aspirations if and only if it
is a compromise rule.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that each compromise rule satises the three axioms.
Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying the three axioms. Let A 2 P. For each pair i; j 2 N ,
with i 6= j, let 1ij denote the matrix with the following entries:
1ijkl =
8<
: 1 if (k; l) = (i; j)0 otherwise.
Notice that 1ijji is the zero matrix, i.e., the matrix with only zero entries.
Let k 2 N: By additivity,
Rk(A) =
X
i;j2N :i6=j
aijRk
 
1ij

: (2)
By symmetry, for each pair k; l 2 N n fi; jg we have that Ri (1
ij) = Rj (1
ij) = xij, and
Rk (1
ij) = Rl (1
ij) = zij. As
P
k2N Rj (1
ij) = jj1ijjj = 1, we deduce that
zij =
1  2xij
n  2
:
Let k 2 N n fi; jg. By additivity, Rj
 
1ij + 1ik

= xij + zik, and Rk
 
1ij + 1ik

= zij + xik.
By symmetry, Rj
 
1ij + 1ik

= Rk
 
1ij + 1ik

. Thus,
xij +
1  2xik
n  2
= xik +
1  2xij
n  2
,
(n  2) xij + 1  2xik = (n  2) xik + 1  2xij ,
xij = xik
Therefore, there exists x 2 R such that for each fi; jg  N;
Ri
 
1ij

= Rj
 
1ij

= x, and
Rl
 
1ij

=
1  2x
n  2
for each l 2 N n fi; jg:
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Let k 2 N . By (2),
Rk(A) = kx+ (jjAjj   k)
1  2x
n  2
= kx+ (2x  1)

(n  1)k   jjAjj
n  2
  k

= kx+ (2x  1)CDk(A)  (2x  1)k
=
k
2
2 (x  2x+ 1) + (2x  1)CDk(A)
= (2  2x)ES(A) + (2x  1)CDk (A) :
Let fi; j; lg  N be a set of three di¤erent teams. By maximum aspirations,
x = Ri
 
1ij

 i
 
1ij

= 1 and
1  2x
n  2
= Rl
 
1ij

 l
 
1ij

= 0:
Thus, 1
2
 x  1. Let  = 2  2x. Then, 1   = 2x  1: As x ranges from 1=2 to 1, it then
follows that  ranges from 0 to 1. Consequently,
Rk(A) = ESk(A) + (1  )CDk(A) = C

k (A);
as desired.
We prove in the Appendix that the three axioms are independent.
Theorem 1 shows that the family of compromise rules is characterized only by three basic
and intuitive axioms, which, when combined, have strong implications to single out a one-
parameter family ranging from the equal-split rule to concede-and-divide.
In Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2020a), we characterized the equal-split rule and
concede-and-divide. Two properties were common in both characterizations. One (equal treat-
ment of equals) was a weakening of the symmetry axiom considered here.16 The other was the
same additivity axiom we consider here. The third property in each characterization came from
a pair of polar properties modeling the e¤ect of null or essential teams.17 What we show with
16Formally, we say that a rule R satises equal treatment of equals if, for each A 2 P, and each pair i; j 2 N
such that aik = ajk, and aki = akj , for each k 2 N n fi; jg, Ri(A) = Rj(A):
17The null team property states that if each game played by a team has no audience, then such a team
(called null) receives nothing. The essential team property states that if only the games played by one team
have positive audience, then such a team (called essential) receives all its audience. Formally, a rule R satises
null team if, for each (N;A) 2 P, and each i 2 N , such that aij = 0 = aji, for each j 2 N , Ri(N;A) = 0: It
satises essential team if, for each (N;A) 2 P, and each i 2 N such that ajk = 0 for each pair fj; kg 2 Nn fig,
Ri(N;A) = i:
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Theorem 1 is that, considering the axiom of maximum aspirations instead of any of the last
two polar properties, allows us to move from characterizing the equal-split rule and concede-
and-divide to characterize the family of all rules generated by their convex combinations.
The compromise rules just characterized are not very demanding from an informational
viewpoint. Although they are dened over matrices, they do not require all the entries from
the matrices to be dened. Just the claims are enough to dene the rules. This will be a
valuable asset for the empirical analysis in Section 5, as, in general, full information about
audiences is rare to exist. On the other hand, information on aggregate audiences for each
team is usually available.
The compromise rules obviously also satisfy other properties beyond those in the state-
ment of Theorem 1. We highlight two of them here because they provide interesting testable
implications for our empirical analysis in Section 5.
The rst one is a strengthening of symmetry and it states that rules yield amounts that
preserve the ranking of claims.
Order Preservation: For each A 2 P and each pair i; j 2 N , such that i  j,
Ri(A)  Rj(A):
The second one states that rules provide amounts that, for each team, lie between the
extreme amounts provided by the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide for each of them.18
Lower and Upper Bounds: For each A 2 P and each i 2 N ,
minfESi(A); CDi(A)g  Ri(A)  maxfESi(A); CDi(A)g:
4 Further insights
4.1 Majority preferences
We have provided in the previous section normative foundations for a family of rules to share
revenues raised from broadcasting. The axiomatic analysis is, nevertheless, silent regarding the
specic rule to choose within the family. We explore such a problem in this section, taking
18Note that, for some teams, the amount that the equal-split rule yields will be smaller than the amount
concede-and-divide yields, whereas for others it will be the opposite.
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a decentralized approach. More precisely, we study whether the choice of a rule within the
family could be made by means of simple majority voting, letting each team vote for a rule
within the family.19 Due to the overwhelming existence of majority cycles, one should normally
not expect a positive answer to this question. Surprisingly, we do get a positive answer in our
setting, thanks to the following feature that compromise rules exhibit.
In what follows, we assume, without loss of generality, that, for each A 2 P, N = f1; : : : ; ng
and 1  2      n, with at least one strict inequality.
20 We show next that the compromise
rules satisfy the so-called single-crossing property. Formally,
Proposition 1 Let 0  1  2  1, and A 2 P. Then, there exists i
 2 N such that:
(i) C1i (A)  C
2
i (A) for each i = 1; :::; i
 and
(ii) C1i (A)  C
2
i (A) for each i = i
 + 1; :::; n.
Given a problem A 2 P, we say that C (A) is a majority winner (within the compromise
rules) for A if there is no other compromise rule C
0
such that C
0
i (A) > C

i (A) for a majority of
teams. We say that the family of compromise rules has a majority voting equilibrium if there is
at least one majority winner (within the compromise rules) for each problem A 2 P. It is well
known that the single-crossing property of preferences is a su¢cient condition for the existence
of a majority voting equilibrium (e.g., Gans and Smart, 1996). Thus, we have the following
corollary from Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 There is a majority voting equilibrium for the family of compromise rules.
We now study which specic compromise rule could be a majority winner for each problem.
We obtain three di¤erent scenarios, depending on the characteristics of the problem at stake;
more precisely, the partition of agents with respect to their claims. For some problems (those
in which there is a high concentration of small claims), only the equal-split rule is a majority
winner. For other problems (those in which there is a low concentration of small claims), only
concede-and-divide is a majority winner. For the remainder of the problems, each compromise
rule is a majority winner.
19This way of proceeding is somewhat realistic in one-team-one-vote environments, such as the one in North
America (e.g., Fort and Quirk, 1995).
20Otherwise, all rules within our family would yield the same allocation.
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For each A 2 P, we consider the following partition of N , with respect to the average
claim (): Nl (A) = fi 2 N : i < g, Nu (A) = fi 2 N : i > g, and Ne (A) = fi 2
N : i = g. That is, taking the average claim (within the tournament) as the benchmark
threshold, we consider three groups referring to individuals with claims below, above, or exactly
at, the threshold. When no confusion arises, we simply write Nl, Nu; and Ne. Note that
n = jNlj+ jNuj+ jNej.
Proposition 2 Let A 2 P. The following statements hold:
(i) If 2jNlj > n, then ES(A) is the unique majority winner.
(ii) If 2jNuj > n, then CD(A) is the unique majority winner.
(iii) Otherwise, each C(A) is a majority winner.
Proposition 2 implies that if the distribution of claims is skewed to the left (i.e., the median
claim is below the mean claim), then the equal-split allocation (the most equal allocation within
the family) is the majority winner, whereas if it is skewed to the right (i.e., the median claim
is above the mean claim), then the concede-and-divide allocation (the most unequal allocation
within the family, as proved below) is the majority winner. If it is not skewed, then any
compromise allocation can be a majority winner.21
The single-crossing property also guarantees that the social preference relationship obtained
under majority voting is transitive, and corresponds to the median voters. In our setting,
the median voter corresponds to the team with the median overall audience (claim). Thus,
depending on whether this median overall audience is below or above the average audience, the
median voters preferred rule (and, thus, the majority winner) will either be the equal-split rule
or concede-and-divide. In other words, a tournament with a small number of very strong teams
(i.e., with very high claims in relative terms) will proclaim the equal-split allocation (the one
favoring weaker teams more within the family) as the majority winner, whereas a tournament
with a small number of very weak teams (i.e., with very small claims in relative terms) will
proclaim the concede-and-divide allocation (the one favoring stronger teams more within the
family). The reader is referred to the Appendix for the details.
21This is somewhat consistent with empirical evidence recently found in voting experiments on redistribution
(e.g., Jiménez-Jiménez et al., 2019).
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4.2 Distributive power
We now turn to the distributional e¤ects of the rules within the family. More precisely, we
show that the rules within the family are completely ranked according to the so-called Lorenz
dominance criterion, the most fundamental criterion of income inequality.
Formally, given x; y 2 Rn satisfying x1  x2  :::  xn, y1  y2  :::  yn, and
Pn
i=1 xi =Pn
i=1 yi, we say that x is greater than y in the Lorenz ordering if
Pk
i=1 xi 
Pk
i=1 yi, for each
k = 1; :::; n   1, with at least one strict inequality. This criterion induces a partial ordering
on allocations which reects their relative spread. When x is greater than y in the Lorenz
ordering, x is unambiguously more egalitarian than y (e.g., Dasgupta et al., 1973; Atkinson
and Bourguignon, 1987).
In our setting, we say that a rule R ismore egalitarian than another R0 if for each A 2 P,
R(A) is greater than R0(A) in the Lorenz ordering.
As mentioned above, the Lorenz ordering is only a partial ordering. Thus, one should not
expect many rules to be ranked according to the egalitarian criterion just described. Nev-
ertheless, as the next result shows, the compromise rules are fully ranked according to the
parameter that denes the family. This parameter can therefore be interpreted as an index of
the distributive power of the rule.
Proposition 3 If 0  1  2  1, then C
2 is more egalitarian than C1.
In particular, one obtains from Proposition 3 that the equal-split rule is the most egalitarian
rule within the family, as expected, whereas concede-and-divide is the least egalitarian rule
within the family. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the equal-split rule is always the fairest
(or concede-and-divide the least fair) rule within the family. Egalitarianism (here formalized as
Lorenz dominance of allocations) does not need to be considered as a synonym of fairness (e.g.,
Sen, 1980; Roemer, 1998). In our environment, fairness of an allocation might depend on several
factors (such as the partition of the audience among loyal fans and casual viewers). Thus, a
proper analysis on fairness in this setting would require an axiomatic approach addressing some
of these factors and thus extending the one we o¤ered in Section 3.
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4.3 Non-negativity
Another interesting aspect of the compromise rules is that they can provide negative amounts
for some teams. Now, given a problem A 2 P, and i 2 N , one might be interested in identifying
the set of rules within the family that yield a positive amount to team i. Here is a clear-cut
answer to that question:
Proposition 4 For each A 2 P and each i 2 N , we have the following statements:
(a) If i  ; then C

i (A)  0; for each  2 [0; 1].
(b) If i < ; then C

i (A)  0 if and only if
  1 
(n  2)i
n (  i)
:
We have the following denition:
Non negativity. For each A 2 P and each i 2 N ,
Ri(A)  0:
Proposition 4 says that, for each rule within the family, teams with an audience above
average will get a non-negative amount. Teams with an audience below average will get a non-
negative amount depending on the relationship between i and : When i is relatively small
with respect to , we need a large  for non-negativity. The only case always guaranteeing a
non-negative allocation to each team is the case in which  = 1, i.e., the equal-split rule. As a
consequence of Theorem 1, we can actually give a characterization of the equal-split rule based
on this property.
Proposition 5 A rule satises additivity, symmetry, maximum aspirations and non negativity
if and only if it is the equal-split rule.
As mentioned in the previous section, we would need additional axioms (reecting princi-
ples with normative appeal too) to extend the analysis in Section 3 and be able to discriminate
within the family (eventually, singling out a member of it as superior to the others in terms
of fairness). If one would consider non-negativity as an axiom of that kind (it is, after all,
formalizing another meaningful bound somewhat complementary to that of maximum aspira-
tions), then we would indeed conclude that the equal-split rule (which happens to be the more
egalitarian rule within the family, as shown in the previous section) is the fairest among the
rules within the family as it is the only one passing the additional test that axiom imposes.
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4.4 On the interpretation of 
As mentioned above, compromise rules are dened by means of a parameter  2 [0; 1] indicating
the relative weight of the equal-split rule in the convex combination with concede-and-divide.
We showed in Section 4.2 that this parameter  can also be interpreted as an index of the
distributive power of the rule, as all rules within the family are fully ranked (in terms of the
Lorenz dominance criterion) according to . We also discuss now that the parameter can be
interpreted as a measure of teams fan bases.
In general, individuals watching a game can be classied as fans of one of the teams involved
in the game, or as neutral viewers. In practice, the above information is not available and we
only know the total audience of the game. We can conjecture several plausible scenarios. For
instance, In the extreme scenario in which the rst group is empty (i.e., no team has fans),
it seems natural to divide viewers of each game equally, which is what the equal-split rule
proposes. In the polar extreme case, in which the second group is empty, it seems natural
to concede each team the amount generated by its fans, which is the allocation proposed by
concede-and-divide.22 In other words,  = 1 is associated to 100% of neutral (non-fan) viewers,
whereas  = 0 is associated to 0% of neutral (non-fan) viewers.
In practice, we know the total number of viewers of each game, but not the partition as fans
and no fans. Now, it is feasible to estimate the average number of fans and no fans watching
the games. For instance, we can take a sample of viewers and ask them to report the games
they have watched, and if they are fans of some team. Let f denote the number of people who
have watched a game being a fan of some of the teams. Let fn denote the number of people
who have watched a game without being a fan of any of the teams. Then,  = f
n
f+fn
is the
percentage of neutral (non-fan) viewers of a game. Similarly, 1   = f
f+fn
is the percentage of
fans watching a game.
In general,  can be considered as an estimation of the percentage of neutral viewers (those
who watch a game without being a fan of one of the teams playing the game). Similarly, 1  
can be considered as an estimation of the percentage of viewers who watch a game because they
are fans of one of the teams playing the game. In other words, a low value of  is associated
with a large fan base for participating teams, whereas a high value of  is associated with a
small fan base for participating teams.
22See Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2020a) for further details.
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5 An empirical application
In this section, we present an empirical application of our model resorting to La Liga, the
Spanish Football League.
La Liga is a standard round robin tournament involving 20 teams. Thus, each team plays 38
games, facing each time one of the other 19 teams (once home, another away). The 20 teams,
and the overall audience (in millions) of each team during the season 2017-2018, are listed in
the rst two columns of Table 1.23
Insert Table 1 about here
Note that the total audience of the entire season is 197:05 millions, and the total revenue
was 1325:6 millions of euros. Thus, in order to accommodate the premises of our model and
identify total audience with total revenue, we have to assume that each viewer paid a pay-per-
view fee of 6:73 euros (instead of only one) per game. This normalizing assumption appears in
Column 3. The resulting scaling will be implicit in the next tables describing the allocations.
Columns 4 and 5 yield the allocation put in practice for the season 2017-18 (in millions
of euros and in percentage terms).24 As we can see, two teams (Barcelona and Real Madrid)
dominated the sharing, collecting (when combined) almost 23% of the pie.
An important conclusion one can derive from Table 1 is that the testable implication we
formalized by the axiom ofMaximum Aspirations is veried, as all teams obtain amounts below
their claims (i.e., the amount in Column 4 is always below the corresponding amount in Column
3). On the other hand, the testable implication we formalized by the axiom of Symmetry is
not veried, as two teams (Real Sociedad and Girona) have equal claims but obtain di¤erent
amounts. Obviously, this infers that the testable implication we formalized by the axiom of
Order Preservation is not veried either. As a matter of fact, we have several violations of it.
For instance, Real Madrid has a higher claim than Barcelona but receives a smaller amount.
Betis actually receives a smaller amount than 7 other teams with a lower claim (Atlético de
Madrid, Valencia, Sevilla, Málaga, Athletic de Bilbao, Real Sociedad, and Villarreal).
Table 2 lists again the allocation put in practice for the season 2017-18, but now together
with the ones proposed by the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide (the two extreme compro-
23Most of the data come from Palco 23, the leading newspaper in economic information of the sport business
in Spain, which refers to Havas Sports and Entertainment as its source.
24The source is La Ligas website. See, for instance, http://www.laliga.es/lfp/reparto-ingresos-audiovisuales
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mise rules). In the last column of this table we explore whether the amount obtained by each
team in the allocation used in practice corresponds to some compromise rule. For instance,
Barcelona receives the amount that the rule C0:98 would yield for this setting. In contrast,
Real Madrid receives less than the amount proposed by any rule within the family because
148 < min f158:43; 260:81g. On the other hand, Atlético de Madrid receives more than the
amount proposed by any rule within the family because 110:60 > max f85:77; 107:43g.
Insert Table 2 about here
Several conclusions can be derived from Table 2. Maybe the most obvious one is that the
testable implication of Lower and Upper Bounds is far from being veried: less than half of
teams obtain amounts within the interval determined by those bounds. More precisely, nine
teams are favored by the actual allocation, in the sense that the amount each gets is above
the amounts suggested by both bounds. Apart from Real Madrid, only one team (Betis)
obtains amounts below those two bounds.25 The remaining nine teams obtain amounts that
can therefore be rationalized by some compromise rule. However, the rule would be di¤erent
for each team. For instance, for Celta, it would be the rule corresponding to  = 0:02 (which
means that it receives something quite similar to the concede-and-divide outcome), whereas,
for Barcelona, it would be the rule corresponding to  = 0:98 (which means that it receives
something quite similar to the equal-split outcome).26 Note that if the parameter  is interpreted
as the percentage of neutral viewers (as argued in Section 4:4), the number for Barcelona is quite
counterintuitive because the audiences of Barcelona games are much larger than the audiences
of all other games (excluding those involving Real Madrid).
Another conclusion is that, contrary to what some might argue, the actual revenue shar-
ing seems to be biased against the two powerhouses. Barcelona receives approximately the
minimum it could receive, whereas Real Madrid receives even less than the minimum. With
concede-and-divide (one of the extreme rules within the family), Barcelona and Real Madrid
25It is actually a remarkable case, as the allocation yields 3:99%, whereas the two rules would recommend
7:1% and 9:44%, respectively.
26Somewhat surprisingly, the compromise rule yielding a closer allocation (according to the Euclidean dis-
tance) to the real allocation is the rule corresponding to  = 1, i.e., the equal-split rule. If we compare both
allocations, one team (Betis) obtains much less (41 millions). Other nine teams (including Real Madrid) also
obtain less (between 1 and 10 millions). The remaining ten teams (including Barcelona) obtain more (between
0 and 25 millions).
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together would receive 38:28% of the pie (instead of the 22:78% they actually receive). We be-
lieve that fairness considerations regarding this issue can only be made with a proper normative
analysis of how to split revenues. We have actually provided normative foundations for a whole
family of rules on sharing revenues. Although the family encompasses a wide array of views,
all of them agree suggesting that the two teams combined should receive something more than
what they currently receive now. Thus, we can indeed argue that, based on our analysis, one
cannot state that Barcelona and Real Madrid are unfairly favored.
6 Discussion
We have studied the problem of sharing the revenues from the collective sale of broadcasting
rights for sports leagues, as recently considered by Bergantiños and Moreno-Ternero (2020a,
2020b). We have considered three basic and intuitive axioms for such a problem. Together,
the three axioms characterize a family of rules that o¤er a compromise between two focal and
somewhat polar rules: the equal-split rule and concede-and-divide. As such, the family is exible
enough to accommodate a wide variety of views regarding the existence of fans associated to
each participating team. It ranges from the extreme view that, de facto, dismisses the existence
of those fan bases (as exemplied by the equal-split rule) to the polar (and, thus, extreme too)
view that minimizes the number of casual viewers, who simply watch a game because they are
interested into the specic pair of teams involved in it (as exemplied by concede-and-divide).
We have also shown that the family has other merits. For instance, it constitutes a domain of
rules for which majority voting equilibrium exists. This is important as the ultimate decision to
approve a sharing rule might come to a vote among participating teams. Thus, guaranteeing the
existence of a majority voting equilibrium, avoiding disturbing majority cycles, seems crucial.
Especially so, when the voting decision is made among a wide variety of options, as in this case.
Our family of rules is reminiscent of some other families that have been considered in
the literature on related topics (such as income inequality measurement, surplus sharing, cost
allocation, or claims problems). Some of these families also o¤er compromises between focal
and somewhat polar rules. Others share with ours the structure regarding the order of their
members (according to the spread of the outcomes they yield), or the majority preferences
(with respect to the members of the family).
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We have also applied the rules within our family to a real-life situation. More precisely, we
have explored the allocation of the (joint) revenues collected from selling broadcasting rights in
the case of La Liga, the Spanish Football League. We have observed that some of the testable
implications of our analysis are not veried for this case, which casts doubts on the allocation
implemented by the Spanish Football League Association. It would be interesting to extend
our empirical analysis to other major leagues such as the English Premier League.
The schemes we obtained for La Liga reected a considerable level of inequality of outcomes.
Much has been written about what constitutes distributive justice (see, for instance, Konow
(2001) and the references therein). Depending on the specic view that one might hold on
distributive justice, the above schemes might be considered fair or not. For instance, it might
be considered fair that teams with a stronger bargaining power (either due to outside options,
better performance, or higher ratings) receive much more.27 On the other hand, inequality
aversion is a widespread phenomenon that might make some consider the above schemes as
unfair.28 Our view is that a proper analysis on distributive justice for this setting requires an
axiomatic approach in which further aspects, such as performance, are considered. New axioms
in such a more general structure, with normative appeal, should help derive new rules. For
instance, hybrid rules in which a portion of the pie is divided according to performance and
another portion according to audiences. Alternatively, generalizations of the equal-split rule, in
which the revenues from each game are split among the two teams playing the game, according
to some weight reecting performance. As this analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, we
leave it for further research.
We conclude acknowledging that our paper is silent about the potential e¤ects of the shar-
ing process (of revenues raised from selling broadcasting rights) into several aspects of sports
leagues. Much has been studied, for instance, about its e¤ects on competitive balance.29 It is
also left for further research to study whether the rules in our family perform in a structured
way with respect to their e¤ect on competitive balance. To begin with, this would require to
consider an appropriate measure of competitive balance, as the literature on sports economics
is ooded with di¤erent measures and no consensus has been reached yet (e.g., Moreno-Ternero
27Rodríguez-Lara (2016) mentions precisely this case in his study on equity and bargaining power.
28As Garner (1986) puts it, individuals become distressed when they participate in unfair relationships, and
the greater the inequity, the more distress they feel.
29See, for instance, Késenne (2000), Szymanski (2001), Szymanski and Késenne (2004), or Peeters (2011).
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and Weber, 2019; Pawlowski and Nalbantis, 2019). A more general model than ours, in which
teams would be modeled as prot-maximizing clubs, determining talent investments resulting in
win probabilities (with playing talent sold on a competitive market), would also be required.30
Finally, it would also be interesting to explore the interdependence of broadcasting rev-
enues and transfer fees (the other major source of revenues in professional sports).31 It is
conventionally argued that the increase in the amounts raised from broadcasting has boosted
transfer fees. Interesting patterns emerge too as a consequence of international di¤erences. For
instance, weak teams competing in the English Premier League (the most powerful domestic
football competition worldwide to raise revenues from broadcasting, with a very egalitarian
sharing system) are able to pay high transfer fees to reasonably strong teams in other strong
domestic competitions (such as La Liga, or Serie A) with a less egalitarian sharing system of
revenues from broadcasting rights. Partly because of this, it might not have been a surprise
to observe that, for the rst time in history, four teams from the same domestic competition
(in this case, the English Premier League) dominated the two international competitions in a
given season (2018-2019).
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To save space, we have included in this appendix, which is not for publication, some technical
aspects of our analysis, as well as secondary proofs.
8 Appendix
Remark 1 The axioms of Theorem 1 are independent.
Let R1 be the rule that arises as a convex combination between the equal split rule and
concede-and-divide, but with the (endogenous) weight obtained by the ratio between the maximum
audience and the overall audience. Formally, for each problem A 2 P, let A = maxi;j2Naij.
Then, for each i 2 N ,
R1i (A) =
A
jjAjj
ESi(A) +

1 
A
jjAjj

CDi(A):
R1 satises symmetry and maximum aspirations, but not additivity.
Let R2 be the rule in which, for each game (i; j) 2 N N , the revenue aij goes to the team
with the lowest number of the two. Namely, for each problem A 2 P, and each i 2 N;
R2i (A) =
X
j2N :j>i
(aij + aji):
R2 satises maximum aspirations and additivity, but not symmetry.
The uniform rule, which divides the total audience equally among the teams, satises addi-
tivity and symmetry, but not maximum aspirations.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let 0  1  2  1, and A 2 P.
We consider two cases:
1. Case i  : In this case,
C1i (A) =
i
2
+
n(1  1)
2 (n  2)
(i   )
=
i
2
+
n(1   1)
2 (n  2)
(  i)

i
2
+
n(2   1)
2 (n  2)
(  i)
= C2i (A):
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2. Case i > : In this case,
C1i (A) =
i
2
+
n(1  1)
2 (n  2)
(i   )

i
2
+
n(1  2)
2 (n  2)
(i   )
= C2i (A):
It turns out that i is precisely the team whose overall audience is closest (from below) to
the average overall audience. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Let 0    1, and A 2 P. By (1), for each i 2 N ,
Ci (A) =
i
2
+
n(1  )
2 (n  2)
(i   ) :
If i < , then C

i (A) is an increasing function of , thus maximized at  = 1. This implies
that, for each i 2 Nl, ESi(A) is the most preferred outcome (among those provided by the
family).
If i > , then C

i (A) is a decreasing function of , thus maximized at  = 0. This implies
that, for each i 2 Nu, CD(A) is the most preferred outcome (among those provided by the
family).
If i = ; then C

i (A) =
i
2
for each  2 [0; 1]. This implies that, for each i 2 Ne, all rules
in the family yield the same outcome.
From the above, statements (i) and (ii) follow trivially. Assume, by contradiction, that
statement (iii) does not hold. Then, there exists A 2 P and  2 [0; 1] such that C is not a
majority winner for A: Thus, we can nd 0 2 [0; 1] such that C
0
i (A) > C

i (A) holds for the
majority of the teams. We then consider two cases:
Case 0 > .
In this case, C
0
i (A) > C

i (A) if and only if i 2 Nl: Now,
jNlj =
ni 2 N : C0i (A) > Ci (A)o
>
ni 2 N : C0i (A)  Ci (A)o
= jNuj+ jNej
which is a contradiction.
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Case 0 < .
In this case, C
0
i (A) > C

i (A) if and only if i 2 Nu: Now,
jNuj =
ni 2 N : C0i (A) > Ci (A)o
>
ni 2 N : C0i (A)  Ci (A)o
= jNlj+ jNej
which is a contradiction. 
We now reformulate Proposition 2 in terms of the median voter. Depending on whether
the number of teams is odd or even, the median can be uniquely determined or not. To avoid
ambiguity, we consider in each case the median to be the mean of the two middle values.
Formally, the median overall audience is dened by
m =
8<
:
n+1
2
if n is odd
1
2

n
2
+ n+2
2

otherwise.
Depending on whether this median overall audience is below or above the average audience,
the median voters preferred rule (and, thus, the majority winner) will either be the equal-split
rule or concede-and-divide. More precisely,
Corollary 2 Let A 2 P be such that n is odd. The following statements hold:
(i) If m < , then ES(A) is the unique majority winner.
(ii) If m > , then CD(A) is the unique majority winner.
(iii) If m = , then any C
(A) is a majority winner.
Proof. If m < , then jNlj  m. Hence jNlj > jNuj + jNej : By Proposition 2, statement (i)
holds.
If m > , then jNuj  m. Hence jNuj > jNlj + jNej : By Proposition 2, statement (ii)
holds.
If m = , then jNlj < m; jNuj < m; and jNej > 0. Hence, we are in case (iii) of the
statement of Proposition 2, which concludes the proof.
Corollary 3 Let A 2 P be such that n is even. The following statements hold:
(i) If n+2
2
< , then ES(A) is the unique majority winner.
(ii) If n
2
> , then CD(A) is the unique majority winner.
(iii) If n
2
   n+2
2
, then any C(A) is a majority winner.
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Proof. If n+2
2
< , then jNlj  m. Hence jNlj > jNuj+ jNej : By Proposition 2, statement (i)
holds.
If n
2
> , then jNuj  m. Hence jNuj > jNlj + jNej : By Proposition 2, statement (ii)
holds.
Suppose now that n
2
   n+2
2
: Then, it is enough to prove that we are in case (iii) of
the statement of Proposition 2. That is, we have to prove that neither jNlj > jNuj + jNej nor
jNuj > jNlj+ jNej hold. We consider several subcases:
1. If  = n
2
, then jNlj <
n
2
, jNuj 
n
2
and jNej > 0.
2. If n
2
<  < n+2
2
, then jNlj =
n
2
, jNuj =
n
2
and jNej = 0.
3. If  = n+2
2
, then jNlj 
n
2
, jNuj <
n
2
and jNej > 0.
In either case, the desired conclusion holds.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let A 2 P.
We rst prove that ES(A) is greater than CD (A) in the Lorenz ordering.
Let i 2 N: By equation (1),
CDi(A) =
i
2
+
n
2 (n  2)
(i   ) :
Thus,
ES1(A)  ES2(A)  :::  ESn(A) and
CD1(A)  CD2(A)  :::  CDn(A): (3)
It then su¢ces to show that, for each k = 1; :::; n  1,
kX
i=1
i
2

kX
i=1

i
2
+
n
2 (n  2)
(i   )

:
But this is simply a consequence of the fact that
kX
i=1
i  k;
for each k = 1; :::; n  1.
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We now prove that C2(A) is greater than C1(A) for each 0  1  2  1. By (3), we
have that
C11 (A)  C
1
2 (A)  :::  C
1
n (A) and
C21 (A)  C
2
2 (A)  :::  C
2
n (A):
Then, it su¢ces to show that, for each k = 1; :::; n  1,
kX
i=1
C2i (A) 
kX
i=1
C1i (A):
Now,
kX
i=1

i
2
+
n(1  2)
2 (n  2)
(i   )


kX
i=1

i
2
+
n(1  1)
2 (n  2)
(i   )

,
kX
i=1
n(1  2)
2 (n  2)
(i   ) 
kX
i=1
n(1  1)
2 (n  2)
(i   ),
(1  2)
kX
i=1
(i   )  (1  1)
kX
i=1
(i   ) :
As
kP
i=1
(i   )  0 and 1  2, the above follows. 
Proof of Proposition 4
Let A 2 P, i 2 N , and  2 [0; 1]. By equation (1) ; Ci (A)  0 if and only if

i
2
+ (1  )
(n  1)i   jjAjj
n  2
 0:
Or, equivalently,
(n  2)i + 2 (1  ) [(n  1)i   jjAjj]  0:
As
jjAjj =
P
i2N
i
2
; and  =
P
i2N
i
n
;
we deduce that
jjAjj =
n
2
:
Then, Ci (A)  0 if and only if
(n  2)i + 2 (1  )

(n  1)i  
n
2

 0:
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Equivalently,
ni   2i + 2ni   2i   2ni + 2i   n + n  0;
or
n (  i)  n  2ni + 2i: (4)
We now consider three cases:
Case i > :
In this case, (4) is equivalent to
 
n  2ni + 2i
n (  i)
= 1 
(n  2)i
n (  i)
:
As   i < 0 we deduce that
1 
(n  2)i
n (  i)
 1;
and hence (4) holds for any  2 [0; 1] :
Case i = :
In this case, (4) is equivalent to 0  (2  n)i; which always holds.
Case i < :
In this case, (4) is equivalent to
 
n  2ni + 2i
n (  i)
= 1 
(n  2)i
n (  i)
;
as stated in the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 5
By Theorem 1, we know that the equal-split rule satises symmetry, additivity andmaximum
aspirations. It is obvious that it also satises non negativity.
Conversely, let R be a rule satisfying the four properties. By Theorem 1, R is a compromise
rule. Thus, there exists  2 [0; 1] such that, for each A 2 P,
R(A) = ES(A) + (1  )CD(A):
Suppose, by contradiction, that  < 1. Then,
R3
 
f1; 2; 3g ; 112

= (1  ) ( 1) < 0;
which contradicts non negativity. Thus,  = 1 and, hence, R  ES: 
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Table 1: Audiences and revenues for the Spanish Football League. Season 2017-18 
Teams Alpha 
(millions) 
Alpha 
normalized 
Allocation 17-18 
(millions euros) 
Allocation  
17-18 (%) 
Real Madrid 47,10 316,85 148,00  11,16  
Barcelona 45,10 303,40 154,00  11,62  
Betis 28,00 188,36 52,90  3,99  
Atlético Madrid 25,50 171,54 110,60  8,34  
Valencia 19,50 131,18 65,70  4,96  
Sevilla 18,50 124,45 74,00  5,58  
Celta 17,80 119,74 52,90  3,99  
Málaga 17,60 118,40 53,50  4,04  
Athletic Bilbao 17,20 115,71 73,20  5,52  
Español 16,70 112,34 52,40  3,95  
Las Palmas 15,90 106,96 46,80  3,53  
Levante 15,10 101,58 45,10  3,40  
Real Sociedad 14,90 100,24 61,50  4,64  
Girona 14,90 100,24 43,30  3,27  
Dep. Coruña 14,30 96,20 46,00  3,47  
Villareal 13,80 92,84 65,50  4,94  
Alavés 13,70 92,16 46,10  3,48  
Getafe 13,50 90,82 44,50  3,36  
Eibar 13,10 88,13 46,30  3,49  
Leganés 11,90 80,05 43,30  3,27  
     
Total 197,05 1325,60 1325,60 100.00 
 
Table 2: The allocation rule and the EC family. 
Team Alloc. 17-18 ES CD lambda 
Real Madrid 148,00  158,43 260,81 Below 
Barcelona 154,00  151,70 246,61 0,98  
Betis 52,90  94,18 125,18 Below 
Atlético Madrid 110,60  85,77 107,43 Above 
Valencia 65,70  65,59 64,82 Above 
Sevilla 74,00  62,23 57,72 Above 
Celta 52,90  59,87 52,75 0,02  
Málaga 53,50  59,20 51,33 0,28  
Athletic Bilbao 73,20  57,85 48,49 Above 
Español 52,40  56,17 44,94 0,66  
Las Palmas 46,80  53,48 39,26 0,53  
Levante 45,10  50,79 33,58 0,67  
Girona 61,50  50,12 32,16 Above 
Real Sociedad 43,30  50,12 32,16 0,62  
Deportivo Coruña 46,00  48,10 27,90 0,90  
Villareal 65,50  46,42 24,35 Above 
Alavés 46,10  46,08 23,64 Above 
Getafe 44,50  45,41 22,22 0,96  
Eibar 46,30  44,06 19,38 Above 
Leganés 43,30  40,03 10,86 Above 
 
